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VIRGINIA S&L SURVEY RESULTS - SUMMER, 1981 
Clarence R. Jun g , Jr . 
David A. Whitaker, Jr. 
E. C.R.S .B. 81-5 
Yllt GINIJ\ S&L SUH\ll:Y HESULTS - SUMt-lEH, 1981 
1he current difficultie s o f the nation's thrift industry are 
mirrored in the results of a recent survey of the member organi-
zatiorl' 1of th e Virginia League . ll1e. survey i.nclicated that Savings & 
Loan Associations in Virginia are undergoing a financial squeeze • 
of unprecedent ed intensity, a squeeze that is exceeding earlier expec-
tations. The Survey also showed that coming to terms with this _ crisis 
is proving to be difficult. 
During the summer of 1981 1 88 member Associations of the Virginia 
" 1,, • • 
~ague were asked to respond to a questionnaire relating to profit-
ability, asset and liability management , and policy alternatives. The 
response rate was excellenttwith 53 Associations answering the ques~ 
tions in some detail . A summary of responses to the various questions 
was given in a presentation before the fall Management Conference of 
the League. The present article seeks to provide a broad interpre-
tation of the Survey results. 
The Profit Picture 
Bleak, of course, is the operative word here. 
But, the important modifying phase is "worse than previously 
expected", as indicated in the table below. 
I 
I 
L------·- · · 
Table 1 
Profit Expectations: 1981 
(Percent of All S&L' s Expecting Profit/Loss 
As of August, 1981 As of March, 1981 
Profit Loss Profit Loss 
Profit/Loss Range 
Less than $50,000 5.9% 9.8% NA 3.2% 
$50,000-$150,000 5.9 3.9 NA 3. 2. 
$150,000-$300,000. 11.8 NA 12.9 
$300,000 or more 1. 9 60.8 NA 32 . 3 
13. 7% 86.3% 48~4% . 51.6% 
This profit squeeze reflects, of course, the negative spread 
shown in Table 2. 
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/>.not.her set of statistics also illustrates the probl em of 
the adverse spread. Of the fixed-rate mortgages held by · associ-
ations, some 60% yield less than 10% wl,ile one-half of the Associ-
ations have h ,lf of their liability portfolio in money market certi-
ficates yielding (obviously) well over thnt 10% fiRuro for l9R1. 
Even moro ominous . (and a statistic considcrcll later in th.ls nrt.lclo) 
is the fact that appI'Dximately 80\ of the fixed rate mortgages yield 
less than 12%. 
Nee<l for Flexibility 
The figures on profitability well illustrate the unhappy an~ 
' . 
deteriorating environment for all but the newest and most insulated 
Associations. The question obviously arises as to what can be done to 
meet this challenge. 
One answer would seem to lie in the attalnrnent of more flexi-
bility. Data from the Survey indicate that Associations are making 
.some prnr.ro•,!l in thi .~ <llr cctl.on but losing ground in others. This is 
indicated in several ways. 
First, loans processed by participating Associations in th~ sec-
....... -
. ·-
~·-- .• -=: ~- :· ... ·~ 
:·--·· ·· ----·-· .. 
Two-thirds of the Associations were doing at least some second mort- . 
gage lending. Pew of the Associations, however, were making more than 
r :., . 
ten percent of th(~ir loans in this category , an<l consumer loans 
wore being ini tiate<l hy only ;i handful of firms. 
Second, funds raised with money market certificates have been 
invested in such a way as to enhance liquidity of the Associations . 
Investments in short-term securities were reported by some two-
thirds to three-fourths of the participating Associations . While this 
does not appear to be consistent with the l onger run role of thrift 
i nstitutions in our economy, it is a necessity for t he time bei ng. 
Third , Associations are obtaining NOW accounts at a rapid pace . 
TI1e number of NOW accounts increased by 30 to 40 percent in the sec - . 
ond quarter of 1981 , and average ba l ances fel l by relative l y small 
amounts. Yet it must be noted , that these more expensive new ac-
counts were not compensating by any means for the loss in passbook 
deposits experienced in that quarter. On a tota l -do ll ar basis for 
passbook plus NOW accounts, the drain was at a rate of over ten per-
cent per year. lhis suggests these funds were being lost--certainly 
to higher yields and possibly to competing institutions. Retention 
of funds in these categories thus would appear to be a holding oper-
ation at best . 
Fourth , adjustable mortgates were becoming a definite fixture 
in the mortgage picture in Virginia i n the second qua rt er of 198 1 . 
About one-fourth of the participating Associations \,·ere offering 
"variable rate" mortgages exclusively. Nearly three-fourths were 
offering the variable rate in some degree . Herc , again , certain cau -
tionary notes should be sounded , as indicated in the following dis -
cussion. 
6. 
Adjust. a ble 1,1ortg,1 ~ ~ cricn cc 
Despite the indication s --notcd abovc--that the industr'y is 
moving lnto the realm of adju sta ble (i.e., market-Mirndtiv0-) II\Ott-
gu8c .in~tru ments, the facts ure that the . steps are somewhat tenta-
tive, are coming at possibly a rather late point in the interest -
rate cycle, and may not be based on the best choice of variable rate 
index. 
TI,at the move to variable rate mortgages is less than vigorous 
is indicated by the fact that only a fourth of the Associations are 
exclusively ih this category, and for a large portion of those offer-
... . 
" · ing both fixed and variable-rate paper, _some 90 percent of all · mort:. <. 
gages were in fixed rate instruments . . That the policy of offering 
such mortgages may be coming late in the cycle is, of course, par-
tially a matter of conjecture and projection of future interest 
rates. If mortt& ge rates have r eached a peak , and there is some evi-
dence to sugge s t this, then the addition of fixed rate mortgages at 
the currently high rates should be attractive. And that the pre-
ferred index is perhaps not optimal is indicated by the fact that 
some half the Associations prefer or use the FliLBB National Mortgage 
C P11lr :1ct l~:1ti- • •- h :1rdt) · a r :1tC' th :lt .moves re adily with changes in the 
cost of capital to savings and loan associations . The volatile Treas-
ury Bill note is becoming widely used but is an equally questionable 
instrum ent for indexing mortgag e rates . The us e of 1ndexes that 
are acc epta ble in the secondary market also suggests that many of the 
7 
market-sensitive mortgap,es arc being sold; therefore, they · will 
offer little relief during future interest rate fluctu ations, 
The Virginia industry should be rated as moderately successful 
in the light of consumer resistance to, or perhaps lack of famili-
arity with, these new mortga ges. Consumers by a heavy majority are · 
seen as having "reluctant" to only "fair" acceptance of such .terms. 
And the experience in Virginia is quite similar to that in the 
nation as indicated by a recent survey conducted by the American 
Mortgage Insurance Company. 
Asset and Liabi lity Management 
It is self-evident that the management and mntching of costs an&· 
. maturities of assets and liabilities is the road to survival and ulti -
mate profitability in the industry. l11is lesson i,.·as learned by commer-
cial banks during the past 1S years and their experience and flexi-
bility have assisted in maintaining profitability during a particu-
larly adverse period. The question is one of ~hich direction and at 
what pace management should proceed. TI1e Survey indicated that the 
industry is pr oceeding cautiously to develop some answers. 
Firms making positive efforts to reduce the low interest components 
of their mortgage portfolios constitute a sizeable percentage of the 
participating Associations, Most popular was the refinancing of the 
lower rate mortgages, with some attention to inducements for early pay-
off as ~ell as to wr~parounds . 
On the liability side, some forty percent of the larg<;ir Associ-
ation s contt ~mplate the use · of rated securities (backed by mortgage 
portfoli o) to address the asset-liability management prob l em, asso-
ciat ed with long term mortgage lending. 
About one-third of the Associations are either studying or using 
futures trading to the extent recently permitted by more liberal ru l es 
from the FHLBB (i.e., trading in excess of 5%). This may not seem to 
be a large proportion, but it should be pointed out that futures t r ad-
ing is hardly a field that is included in the behavioral repertoire of 
most businesses anywhere so that the aura of mystery surrounding .. this 
activity must be dispelled before much use of this tool can be expected. 
Of course, more and more materials are appearing on this subject, e. g'. ~ 
the recent report from Chase Manhattan Bank. in its Economic Observer. · 
Prospects and Policies for the Future 
11,e readings from our Survey constitute both a call for action and 
a recommendation · for increased selectivity in policies to be adopted by 
the industry and by regulatory bodies. 
Action is req uired because the portfolio problem of most Associ-
ntions is i ndi cated, by the Survey, to be more severe than general l y 
;i,mplc , ti) t !'.C 12 nerc cnt f;\11;"' .• .f:t.· 1·.1-.·· u',. tt '.'l\'l I ti '\ I ' ~ '- ' ' " c- \ l' \ ~ 'l' \' \ \' 111. I' I' \ ". t't• \ i 1 
the she-rt run. 
9 
Selot;Hvi ty is emphasized because \~hatever measures are taken 
must be effective, and indeed one might say, powerful. · Yet thr, 
indicated di rections of change are into uncharted waters for savings 
and loan firms--i.e ., new types of lending, futures trading,equity · 
investment and similar ventures. 
1·,,,t ,,f t !1n 1•11rt" 11t. 1llffi C'.ulties arc attributable to deregu-
1111 l1111 111 tli11 Jnc.k <Jf rr.\1i11lati.on of competing institutions. Ad-
ditional froodo.m .. from existing rules may be necessary for the 
thrift institutions if they are to adjust effectively to the ·~ew 
financial environment. Access to more profitable lending opportunities 
and new fund raising instruments will undoubtedly be required. 
The attain ment of such goals ,~ill, it is obvious to say, chal-
lenge the in dustry. If, however, a definite start can be made on 
achieving the nec~ssary flexibility, and if inflation is brought under 
some measure of control by wiser government policies than some of those 
over the last decade, then there is still reason to believe that the 
1980's can be a happier experience for the industry than might be pro-
jected from the experience of the last two or three years of extreme 
difficulty. 
